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ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABLE
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Keith R. Criddle

ABSTRACT

Economic prescriptions for the sustainable management of fisheries have typically been framed
in the context of commercial fisheries. Fishery management failures have been characterized as
a consequence of disjointedness between individually rational decisions and globally sensible
outcomes-the "tragedy of the commons." The solutions proposed by economists flow from the
insight that rational self-interest can lead to socially beneficial outcomes when ownership is
secure and prices reflect the opportunity cost of resource use. Theoretical and empirical analyses
have demonstrated that sole ownership, individual quotas, territorial use rights, fishing
cooperatives, and common property management regimes can promote biologically and
economically sustainable fisheries. Nevertheless, implementation of these "solutions" has met
with resistance, due in part to the impossibility of uncoupling species within ecological systems
and conflict between the proposed solutions and broadly accepted concepts of social justice. The
problem of devising a sustainable management strategy is exacerbated in fisheries with diverse
consumptive and non-consumptive users. An empirically based simulation-optimization model
is used to characterize the biological and economic effects of alternative management regimes in
a fishery with commercial and sport fishers. The results are generalized to the case of additional
use and nonuse values.

ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABLE
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Introduction
Sustainable fisheries management means different things to different people. From a narrowly
single-species biological perspective, sustainable management of fisheries reduces to the
adoption of regulatory measures designed to ensure that the probability of stock or recruitment
levels falling below specific critical values does not exceed an acceptable risk level. Charles
(2001) proposes comprehensive perspective that incorporates ecological, socioeconomic,
community, and institutional sustainability concepts. In this chapter, sustainable fisheries
management will be characterized as practices intended to ensure that the expected flows of use,
option, and nonuse benefits provided by the fishery are not degraded through time. 1 Use benefits
include the value of commercial, recreational, subsistence and other cultural harvests, the value
associated with observing fish in situ, the harvest value of trophically related species, and the
value of ecosystem services contributed by a sustainable fishery. Option value reflects the value
of preserving the opportunity to use a fishery resource at some future time as well as the value of
preserving the opportunity to use any other resource that is dependent on the sustainable fishery
(Bishop 1982; Freeman 1984). Nonuse benefits are those obtained by vicarious consumers of
the resource:

1 This defmition is similar to that proposed in NRC (1999a), where sustainable fishing is defmed as "fishing
activities that do not cause or lead to undesirable changes in biological and economic productivity, biological
diversity, or ecosystem structure and functioning from one human generation to the next; sustainable fishing does
not lead to ecological changes that foreclose options for future generations." The difference is that the defmition
adopted in this chapter characterizes the value of ecosystem services as nonuse economic benefits and formally
recognizes the stochastic nature of the time stream of benefits.
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benefits derived from knowledge of the existence of a fishery resource; value associated with bequesting
a sustainable fishery resource to future generations; the altruistic value of preserving a fishery for other
unrelated users; and, the value associated with the belief that a sustainable fishery contributes to a
desirable state of the ecosystem (Brown and Goldstein 1984; Miller 1981 ; Miller and Lad 1984; Walsh et
al. 1984).
The fundamental problems faced by fishery managers are that nature cannot satisfy all of the use and
nonuse demands and, in most jurisdictions, fish are unowned until they are reduced to possession.
Because the benefits associated with use and nonuse of fishery resources accrue to different people, the
distribution of benefits cannot be dismissed in a narrow focus on the magnitude of those benefits. When
considering the sustainable management of fisheries, managers are first and foremost faced with the
question of which set of benefits to maximize and consequently, the question of who will benefit from the
fishery. For example, management strategies that support commercial or recreational use benefits imply a
concomitant reduction in the magnitude of nonuse benefits. Allocations between user groups are typically
determined through a political process. Secondary allocations of use benefits are typically based on firstcome-first-serve ownership by capture (derby) rules. Because nonuse benefits are largely nonrivalrous,
they are less likely to engender inefficiencies in the secondary allocation.
When allocations take place through the operation of political processes, every action advantages one
sector relative to another. The preponderance of evidence from fisheries suggests that allocations between
commercial, recreational, and vicarious users are unlikely to be definitively settled by any single
allocation decision. Instead, these allocation battles are reprised whenever a set of stakeholders believes
that their negotiating position has improved. Even in the fortuitous circumstance that an initial allocation
is optimal, changes in exvessel price, factor costs, stock abundance, recreation trip costs, angler success,
willingness to pay for nonuse benefits, etc., will render that allocation suboptimal in subsequent periods
unless a self-correcting mechanism is provided.

The problem of fisheries management has often been characterized as a consequence of disjointedness
between individually rational decisions and globally sensible outcomes. The economic approach to
sustainable resource management flows from the insight that rational self-interest can lead to socially
beneficial outcomes when ownership is secure and prices reflect the opportunity cost of resource use. The
challenge for economic theorists and policy analysts arises from the incompleteness of ownership and the
failure of markets to fully reflect opportunity costs? These problems arise from when the rights to a
resource are nonexclusive or when the exercise of those rights is nonrival (Randall 1983).
Honore (1961) identifies attributes that characterize comprehensiveness of property rights: the right to
possession-the right to exclusive physical control of the thing owned; the right to usufruct-the right to
enjoyment and use of the thing owned; the right to manage-the right to decide how and who gets to use
the thing owned; the right to income-the right to compensation for foregoing use of the thing owned; the
right to capital-the rights to consume, waste, modify, or destroy the thing owned; the right to securitythe right to rely on the police powers of the state to defend against expropriation; the right to alienatethe right to bequest, sell, or otherwise dispose of the thing owned; the absence of term-the right to
infinite durability of ownership; the prohibition of harmful use-the duty to forebear from harming others
with the thing owned; the liability to execution-the thing owned can be used as collateral and taken as
repayment for debt; and the residuary character-the right to determine succession of ownership. In

2 It is important to differentiate between the role that fishery scientists play in predicting the likely outcome of
alternative management actions and their advocacy for particular policies or outcomes. The goal of developing
sustainable fisheries is a normative choice. The prediction that a particular management regime is unlikely to result
in sustainability is a positive assessment and should not be assumed to represent a normative preference for that
outcome.
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practice, property rights to resources are attenuated to varying degrees along each of these dimensions.
The potential attenuation of property rights along a continuous gradation in each of these dimensions
creates an infinite degree of variability in the attributes of ownership and leads to confusion when terms
are incautiously used to describe broad ill-defined categories of property. The terms "common property"
and "public goods" are notorious in this respect.
In the United States and many other nations, the legal definition of property rights is based on Roman
law. In brief, Roman law recognized things that belonged to someone (rez in patrimonio) and things that
were outside private ownership but could be acquired (rez extra patrimonium). The rights attached to the
latter category depended on specific characteristics. Roads, harbors, and rivers were classified as public
property (rez publicae). Public edifices were identified as institutional property (rez institutiones). Water,
shorelines, fish, and wildlife were identified as common property (rez communes). Things that were
incapable of ownership, had been abandoned, or had not yet been acquired by private interests were
defmed as unowned property (rez nullius). Common property and unowned property could be
transformed into private property through capture (occupatio) or accretion (accesio). Thus fish in the wild
are unowned but become private property when reduced to possession. (For additional detail see e.g.,
Adams 1993.)

These categories of property are represented in Figure 1 in terms of the extent to which non-owners are or
can be excluded from using the property and in terms of the degree to which use by one person detracts
from the amount or quality of resource available for use by others.

Public Goods

Private
Property

Cornmon
PrOpe1ty

State
Prope1ty

Open
Access

Congestible Goods

Private Goods

Exclusive

Nonexclusive

Exclusive

Nonexclusive

Figure I.-Categories of property ownership and types of goods.

Activities related to fisheries differ in exclusivity and rivalry. The owner of a private stocked pond has
exclusive harvest rights and if she chooses to exercise those rights to take and consume a fish, the act of
eating that fish is strictly rivalrous. An individual who sport fishes on a public stream is prohibited from
excluding others from sportfishing on that stream. If he retains his catch, his activity is rivalrous. If he
releases his catch, his fishing is nonrivalrous, but his presence on the stream may contribute to
congestion. Benefits derived by individuals from knowledge of the continued existence of fish stock are
nonrivalrous and nonexclusive. The "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968) arises when resource use is
rivalrous, access is nonexclusive, ownership is established by capture, and the individual benefits of
resource use exceed the capture costs.
Because the beneficiaries of public goods are a large and diverse group, none of whom expects to capture
exclusive benefits from any expenditure that they incur to provide the public good, many of those who
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benefit from the provision of the public good will freeride, gaining benefit in excess of their willingness
to pay for actions that preserve or enhance the public good (Calabresi 1968). Consequently, individual
consumers have an incentive to understate their willingness to pay for goods that they cannot be excluded
from enjoying and markets will provide suboptimal levels of public goods (Samuelson 1954).
There are two basic solutions to externalities and freerider problems: the adoption and enforcement of
regulations and standards; or, design and adoption of more complete rights. Regulations are attempts to
prevent undesirable but rational responses by fishers to the perverse incentives created by nonexclusive
rights to rivalrous goods (NRC 1999b). Rights-based systems rely on the definition of more
comprehensive rights in order to change the incentives presented to fishers.
Commercial and recreational fisheries have traditionally been managed under command and control
systems consisting of regulations and standards that stipulate minimum or maximum size, open and
closed seasons (days), maximum target and bycatch retention limits, sex, and permissible gear. For
example, the Bristol Bay, Alaska salmon fishery is subject to maximum vessel length standards (32 feet),
minimum gillnet mesh size standards (4 inches), limitations on the total number of participants (limited
entry), and restrictions on fishing locations and times. Similarly, trout anglers may be subject to allowable
gear standards (e.g., artificial flies only), retention limits (2 fish per day, 4 fish in possession), and slot
size standards (e.g., a prohibition on the retention of fish under 14 inches or over 24 inches). The efficacy
of command and control actions depends on the extent to which fishers can substitute unconstrained
inputs or avoid being detected in violation of standards or regulations. Command and control systems
may also include the use of fines, fees, taxes, or subsidies to induce fishers to internalize the negative or
positive externalities associated with their actions. For example, the Vessel Incentive Program in the
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands groundfish trawl fishery was intended to induce avoidance of chinook
bycatch by assessing a fine for each chinook caught. Similarly, recreational user fees reduce the extent to
which recreators freeride on the cost of maintaining recreational areas.
Instead of arbitrarily specifying taxes, fees, subsidies, etc. in an effort to cause fishers to internalize the
costs and benefits of their actions, the rights bundle could be more completely specified. Rights-based
approaches involve the definition and enforcement of rights such that externalities and the opportunity to
freeride are reduced. When the rights bundle is well specified, individuals have an incentive to defend the
value of their property through negotiation and civil action (Coase 1960; Buchanan and Tullock 1962;
Libecap 1989).

A Brief Review of the Development of Economic Thought about the Management
of Fisheries
The underlying cause of problems in open-access fisheries has been attributed to incompletely specified
property rights. Although theoretical and empirical analyses have demonstrated that sole ownership,
individual quotas, territorial use rights, fishing cooperatives, and common property management regimes
can promote biologically and economically sustainable fisheries, the focus of such analyses has been on
the provision of use and option benefits and consequently may not address the sustainability of nonuse
benefits.
Although Gordon (1953; 1954) and Scott (1955) established the economic benefits of sole ownership vis
a vis open access, the special legal character of fishery resources has been has been found to restrict the
conditions under which exclusive use rights can be conveyed to individuals. The special legal attributes of
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fishery resources arise in part from what is commonly referred to as the Public Trust Doctrine. 3 The
Public Trust Doctrine is a portion of common law, derived from Roman civil law, which provides that
certain waters, the lands beneath those waters, and the living resources within those waters are held in
trust by the state for the benefit of citizens. One of the earliest applications of the Public Trust Doctrine
argued before the U.S. Supreme Court was Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. (1892). The court
found that title to public trust lands is:
" ... different from the title the United States holds in the public lands which are open to pre-emption and
sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the States that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters,
carry on commerce over them, and have liberty offishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference
ofprivate parties.
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like
navigable waters and the soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control ofprivate
parties than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of
the peace."

Because public trust resources are held on behalf of the citizens, the State may be precluded from
transferring comprehensive ownership rights to individuals. In general, conveyance of public trust
resources to private ownership does not terminate the public's right of access or the State's responsibility
for stewardship. Consequently, when a usufructuary right to harvest fishery resources is conveyed to
individuals, the State continues to have responsibility for safeguarding the sustainability of those
resources. The Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (MSFCMA), and international treaties reinforce the stewardship responsibilities implicit
in the Public Trust Doctrine.

Because sole ownership is not legally viable or politically feasible, resource economists sought
alternatives that might achieve comparable benefits. Christy and Scott (1965) and Gulland and Robinson
(1973) suggested that binding input restrictions could potentially achieve efficiency gains comparable to
those expected under sole-ownership. Several limited entry programs were implemented in the 1970's.
However, wherever unrestricted substitute inputs existed, and unrestricted substitute inputs invariably
existed, input limitation per se failed to control the race for fish and ensuing dissipation of resource rents.
Evaluations of the outcome of limited entry programs can be found in inter alia Rettig and Ginter (1978),
Adasiak (1979), Fraser (1979), Meany (1979), Pearse and Wilen (1979), and Wilen (1979). Despite the
many documented examples of the inefficacity of input limitations, commercial fishery managers
continue to implement input limitation programs. One recent example is the Individual Transferable Pot
Quota (ITPQ) for spiny lobster (SAFMC 1992). While ITPQs place a limit on the number of units of
fishing gear, they leave open the possibility of capital stuffing in unconstrained input factors and fail to
address the externalities associated with gear conflict or stock depletion.

The failure of input control programs led economists to suggest output controls in the form of individual
quotas (Moloney and Pearse 1979; Pearse 1980; Morey 1980). The MSFCMA defines individual fishing
quotas (IFQs) as limited access permits to harvest quantities of fish. Thus IFQs convey an exclusive
usufruct to decide when and how to use the quota shares, but do not extend to ownership of the resource
itself or the authority to decide how much of the resource can be harvested in aggregate. These latter
remain the trust responsibility of the state. IFQs are best suited to fisheries managed by setting a Total
Allowable Catch (TAC). Indeed, IFQs are commonly expressed as shares of the TAC, so that the annual

McCay (1998) provides an extensive discussion of the application ofthe Public Trust Doctrine to US fisheries.
Macinko (1993) examines the relationship between the Public Trust Doctrine and IFQs.
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realization of the IFQ fluctuates with variations in the level of the T AC. The T AC is usually determined
on an annual basis by applying a target exploitation rate to an estimate of the current stock size.
Determining the target exploitation rate and measuring the stock size are both subject to considerable
uncertainty because of large variability in the relationship between stock size and subsequent recruitment
and to general difficulty of accurately counting and measuring fish in the wild. Wilen (1985) and Scott
(1988), among others, argue that harvest rights are secure, cheating is precluded, and there are no unique
spatial or temporal concentrations that could lead to a race for fish, usufructuary rights will induce IFQ
holders to behave in a manner analogous to a sole owner. Other authors (e.g. Johnson and Libecap 1982;
Keen 1983) argue that more comprehensive rights, including the authority to independently determine
harvest levels, are a necessary condition for economic efficiency.
Several IFQ programs were implemented during the 1980's and 1990's, including three in the U.S.: midAtlantic Surf Clam-Ocean Quahog (MAFMC 1990); South Atlantic Wreckfish (SAFMC 1992); and,
North Pacific Halibut-Sablefish (NPFMC 1991). Evidence from the three U.S. IFQ fisheries suggests that
IFQs have increased net revenues for the harvesters and integrated harvester-processors that were initial
recipients of the IFQ, consolidated the number of active harvest platforms, and distributed landings over
longer seasons (Gauvin et al. 1994; Casey et al. 1995; Wang 1995; NRC 1999b; Herrmann 1996,2000).
Evidence with respect to quota busting, highgrading, and bycatch is mixed (NRC 1999b). In addition,
stock and production externalities have not been eliminated (Boyce 1992), wealth and opportunity of
other stakeholders, e.g. processors, may have been reduced (Matulich et al. 1999; Matulich and Sever
1999), and rent-seeking associated with acquisition and defense of the IFQ may have dissipated much of
the windfall gain associated with the initial distribution.
According to the conventional argument, adopting an IFQ will increase economic efficiency, improve
conservation and stewardship, and improve safety. It is argued that excess harvesting and processing
capacity leads to temporally compressed seasons, reduced exvessel prices, elevated harvesting costs, and
consequently drives the expected value of net revenues to zero. Accordingly, the introduction of an IFQ
program is expected to lead to increased exvessel prices (due to improved product handling and improved
product flow to market) and cost savings (due to the discontinuation of the high-cost fishing practices
followed under open access). Figure (2) depicts the effects of cost savings and a price increase.
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Figure 2.-The effect of an increase in exvessel price and reduction in harvest costs associated with implentation of
an IFQ. Thin lines reflect conditions prior to the price increase and cost decrease.

In the absence of exclusive harvest rights, effort is expected to expand until the costs faced by the last
entrant equal their expected average revenues, an outcome depicted in the first panel of Figure (3) as the
intersection between the exvessel demand and average cost curves and corresponding to the intersection
of the total revenue and total cost curves in the second panel of Figure (3). In contrast, a sole-owner
would equate marginal revenue with marginal cost, thereby maximizing net revenues.
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Figure 3.-The effect of an increase in exvessel price and reduction in harvest costs associated with implentation of
an IFQ. Thin lines reflect conditions prior to the price increase and cost decrease.

In this example, open access results in a sustainable yield of about 72 million pounds at an exvessel price

of US$I.42 per pound, average costs equal to US$1.42 per pound landed, and zero net revenues. The sole
owner would harvest a sustainable yield of about 42 million pounds at an exvessel price of US$2.21 per
pound and earn net revenues of about US$72 million. The magnitude of net revenues gained by IFQ
holders depends on the extent to which they collectively mirror the behavior of a sole owner.
Gear loss and gear conflict are commonly reported problems in temporally compressed fisheries. In
addition, the ownership-by-capture rule discourages individual fishers from taking conservation actions
that could increase future catches but would reduce their current individual catch because they cannot be
assured of benefiting from those increased future catches. Moreover under open access, other fishers
would simply increase their current period catch to take advantage of any leftover TAC. Under IFQs,
there is greater flexibility in selecting fishing time and area, with the possibility of reduced bycatch and
greater product recovery. In addition, IFQ fishers may set (and lose) less gear, thereby reducing ghost
fishing and damage that lost gear may cause to the marine environment. Consequently, IFQs are likely to
reduce some of the stewardship problems that arise under open access. However, because IFQs are
usufructuary rights to a share of the common resource and not rights to particular fish, shareholders have
no assurance that others will refrain from practices that are contrary to the overall maximization of
sustainable benefits and may conserve at less than the socially optimal level, especially when
shareholders are numerous and heterogeneous (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994; Criddle and Macinko
2000). In addition, if the initial allocation ofIFQs is through a political process, much of the potential net
benefits of the IFQs could be dissipated in a race for quota shares (Kruger 1984; Anderson and Hill 1990;
Criddle 1994).

Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) are spatially based individual or collective harvest privileges
(Christy 1982; Seijo 1993). They are a special case of spatial harvest restrictions and have often been
applied in less industrialized and smaller-scale coastal fisheries where management has been based on
restricting participation to a localized population in a limited geographical area. Examples of TURFs
include nearshore fisheries in Japan (Ruddle 1989) and Norway (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994). Similar
rights have been documented for fisheries in South America (Cordell and McKean 1992; Gonzalez,
1996), the Caribbean (Berkes 1987), Asia Minor (Berkes 1986), the South Pacific (Goodenough 1951 ;
1963; Johannes 1978; Carrier 1987; Lieber 1994), and in North America (Higgs 1982; McEvoy 1986;
Bay-Hansen 1991 ; Newell 1993; Agnello and Donnelley 1975; McCay 1998; Acheson 1988).
Under a secure TURF management structure with durable and transferable rights, harvesters will select
efficient levels of capital investment, and if the rates of larval dispersion and adult migration between
areas are low, they will internalize the benefits of stock conservation (Criddle et al. 2001 ). However, it
may be rational for TURF leaseholders to deplete the target stock if the stock has low productivity or if
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there is a high level of uncertainty about future stock abundance, price, or costs. Moreover, if the
boundaries of the TURF are porous, that is, if it is difficult to control the number of participants, or if
there is significant larval dispersion or adult migration, there will be an increased incentive to deplete the
stock.

Commercial fishing cooperatives (Co-Ops) have recently emerged in fisheries off the Pacific Northwest
and Alaska. Like IFQs, the Co-Op shares are use privileges that permit the shareholders to decide when
and how to exercise their shares, but do not include ownership of the resource itself or the authority to
select aggregate harvest levels above limits set by the State. Co-Op members rely on civil law to enforce
contracts that partition the Co-Op's share of the TAC. Co-Op formation depends on the existence ofa
closed class of similarly situated and motivated fishers and on an assessment by the Justice Department
that the formation of the Co-Op is not a prima fascia violation of statutory prohibitions on anticompetitive behavior (Larkin and Sylvia 1999). Co-Ops are, effectively, sole-owners of a fixed
percentage of the T AC and, through negotiated contract, partition that ownership among the Co-Op
members. Initial assessment of the outcomes of pollock Co-Ops in the Bering Sea suggests that product
recovery rates have increased, that the mix of products has shifted to include a greater percentage of
higher valued product forms, that product prices have increased, and that increased flexibility in
harvesting and processing are thought to present opportunities for cost savings (NPFMC 2001). Felthoven
(2001) demonstrates that the technical efficiency and capacity utilization of actively operated catcherprocessors has increased under the Co-Ops when compared for the same vessels or firms in the years
immediately preceding Co-Op formation. In comparison to IFQs, Co-Ops offer the potential advantage of
smaller numbers and greater homogeneity among shareholders, thereby reducing transactions,
monitoring, and enforcement costs (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994). Consequently,
Criddle and Macinko (2000) argue that Co-Ops are likely to generate greater aggregate net revenues and
fewer stock externalities than IFQs. Townsend (1995; 1997) explores the hypothetical characteristics of a
corporate approach to fisheries management similar to the North Pacific fishing Co-Ops.

While limited entry and IFQs, and to a lesser degree TURFs and Co-Ops, have attracted most of the
attention of economists focused on commercial fisheries, it is important to note that numerous fisheries
have been or continue to be managed as traditional commons without engendering a pathological race for
fish. For example, most TURFs are based on custom and tradition and lack formal legal standing. The
allocation of grazing resources in the western US during the late 1800s's (Anderson and Hill 1975;
Dennen 1976) was based on a similarly extra-legal foundation. Although the establishment of mineral and
water claims in the western US during the late 1800' s lacked a basis in US law, it was recognized and
enforced in the mining camps and eventually codified as the Mining Law of 1872 and the doctrine of
prior appropriation that governs water allocation in most of the western US. The decision to allocate a
resource as a private or collective good is a matter of public choice. The consequences of the decision
depend on the interplay between the intrinsic characteristics of the good (Figure 1) and the institutions
created to support the allocation. Olson (1965), Ostrom (1990), Stevenson (1991), and Ostrom et al.
(1994) develop theoretical conditions under which collective action may be preferred to private action.
McCay and Acheson (1987), Berkes (1989), and Bromley (1992) include case studies of fishery and other
resources that have been successfully managed as common property. However, when resource use is
rivalrous, current resource appropriators are numerous, additional appropriators cannot be denied access,
current and potential appropriators are heterogeneous, monitoring and enforcement is difficult, the
commons devolves into open access, dissipating economic value an increasing the likelihood of
overexploitation.
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Thus far, the discussion has focused narrowly on the use benefits that accrue to commercial and artisinal
fishers with no attention to changes in the welfare (consumer surplus) of those who purchase fish from the
harvesters, no attention to the provision of sportfishing and related use values, and no discussion of the
provision of nonuse values. In general, management regimes that reduce the quantity of fish harvested
also reduce the magnitude of consumer surplus. Consequently, to the extent that IFQs, TURFs, Co-Ops,
etc., successfully mimic sole ownership, they simultaneously reduce consumer surplus. The consequences
of a tradeoff between harvester net revenue and consumer surplus will be explored in the theoretical
model and empirical example developed below.
Although the model also includes a measure of the net economic benefits of sportfishing, it does not
address the question of how the magnitude of sportfishing net benefits varies under alternative
management regimes. Most North American sport fisheries are regulated open access resources; the
number of entrants is unconstrained, but there are regulations to limit the choice of fishing technology and
daily catch and possession. In a small number of sport fisheries, the total catch may be restricted with
annual catch limits (e.g., no more than 5 king salmon per year from streams on Alaska's Kenai Peninsula)
or lotteries for a limited number of fishing-days on a particular stream system. In addition, some private
firms use price to allocate sportfishing opportunities in put-and-take ponds. While most North American
sport fisheries operate under some form of regulated open access, there are examples of rights-based sport
fisheries in Europe and IFQs are being considered for the charter-based halibut sport fishery in Alaska.
Private sport fisheries can exist in Europe because wild animals in situ were the property of the Crown
rather than the people and in certain locations the Crown transferred durable ownership of fish and
wildlife resources to private individuals. Consequently, private sportfishing clubs exist on many stream
reaches in Europe where they hold comprehensive rights including the right to possession, the right to
use, the right to manage, the right to compensation for damage to the resource, the right to consume the
resource and the right to transfer ownership to others When the U.S. gained independence from Great
Britain, the Crown' s claim to fish and wildlife resources as well as the derivative claims of Crown
grantees were disallowed and fish and wildlife became property of the citizens as a whole. The proposed
implementation of an IFQ for charter-based halibut fishing has been motivated primarily as a pragmatic
approach to depoliticize the allocation between sport and commercial fishers. The economic
consequences of transforming a sport fishery from regulated open access to TURFs, IFQs, or another
rights-based management regime are not yet well understood and the legality of such privatizations of
public trust resources has not yet been established.
The provision of nonuse benefits is problematic because such benefits are usually assumed to be nonrival
and nonexclusive. That is, one person's enjoyment of nonuse benefits does not affect the supply of nonuse
benefits available for the enjoyment of others and, it is difficult to exclude individuals from obtaining
nonuse benefits. The consequence of these features is that individuals' demand for nonuse benefits will be
under-represented in market transactions. Unfortunately, the same factors that lead individuals to underrepresent their value for nonuse benefits in market transactions lead them to over-represent their value for
nonuse benefits when the cost of providing the benefits are shared with others. When the State retains
stewardship responsibility for the resource, interested parties can lobby for management actions that are
expected to increase nonuse benefits. Rights-based management regimes could be designed to allow
interested parties to acquire harvest rights in an initial allocation or through subsequent transfer. Because
limited entry programs do not convey a right to catch shares, acquisition and nonuse of limited entry
rights is not likely to generate increased nonuse benefits. Although IFQs and Co-Ops entitle holders to
shares of the T AC and thus unfished shares represent actual reductions to annual catch, any biomass
carried over from one year to the next would simply increase the magnitude of quota shares for all
shareholders in the ensuing year. Unfished TURFs are de facto aquatic reserves. Consequently for species
with low migration rates, TURFs may offer greater potential for generating long term increases in nonuse
benefits than other management regimes.
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Maximizing Sustainable Net Benefits
The objective of sustainable fisheries management can be characterized as a constrained maximization of
the net present benefits associated with the flow of use, option, and nonuse benefits over time:
Maximize NB

=

t ( J~r)1

(1)

(NBus"NBoPlion,NBnonuse)).

t=to

subject to Xt =

Ix(Xt-k ,Xt-k, Yt-k ) -

ht-I ,

where Xt is the current biomass of the i -th age-class of the target species, Xt-k is the lagged biomass of
the target species, Xt-k is a vector of the lagged biomass of species that are related to the target species
through trophic or bycatch relationships in t - k ,and Yt-k is a vector of lagged environmental factors
that influence stock dynamics. Target species biomass is assumed to be an increasing (at a decreasing
rate) function of the previous year's biomass, a decreasing function of past harvests, and influenced by
current and lagged environmental conditions and the current and lagged abundance of other species
through trophic or bycatch relationships. That is,
aXt
0 2 Xt
-8->0 , -2-<0,and
Xt-I

oX
t- I

aXt
~<O ,
U''1-I

while
2
a Xt

OXt

aXt

aXt-k ' aXt - IaXt-k ' oYt-k ,an

d

2
a Xt

OXt-IaYt-k

could be positive or negative depending on the particular combination of variables and lags.
The discount rate r reflects societal time preferences. Net use benefits (NBuse) in period (t) include the
benefits associated with commercial, recreational, subsistence, and other uses of the fishery resource:
NBuse

= f( NBcommercial,NBsport,NBsubsistence,NBother ).

Because net option benefits ( NBoption ) can be motivated as the present value of securing an option to
derive net use benefits at some future time, they can be subsumed in the time stream of expected net use
benefits. Net nonuse benefits (NBnonuse ) in period t are related to the magnitude of present and future
stock biomass:
NBnonuse =

I( Xt+k

).

Limiting the solution to equation (1) to those cases where the expected stock is time invariant satisfies the
requirement of biological sustainability. The additional requirement that the expected flow of net benefits
not degrade through time, suggests that the solution to equation (1) must be subject to the constraint
dNB

dt

>0.
-

This constraint is satisfied if net benefits are constant through time and the discount rate is set to zero
(r == 0) or if the rate of increase of net benefits through time equals the social rate of discount. One
characteristic of the optimal solution is that resources will be shifted among use and nonuse activities
until marginal net benefits are equal across all activities.
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Before proceeding to explore the properties of a specific application of this model, it is important to
acknowledge some of the difficulties and limitations to this approach. Equation (1) assumes that all net
benefits can be reified, estimated, and expressed in a dollar metric, and that it is meaningful to sum the
suite of net benefits. In fact, nonuse benefits and some use benefits do not lend themselves to
quantification, are difficult to estimate, and are not easily expressed in monetary terms. Moreover, a
simple summation of net benefits may not reflect social preferences with respect to the mix of benefits
provided or their distribution. A complaint often levied against models similar to equation (1) is that
future generations are not expressly represented. This concern about intergeneration equity applies
particularly to the case of exhaustible resources and irreversible investments. The concern about
intergeneration equity does not apply for sustainably managed fishery resources except to the extent that
it may take time to move from one particular sustainable allocation to another. If changes in social
preferences could be predicted through time, it would be possible to arbitrage the transition from a
currently preferred sustainable combination of use and nonuse benefits to a future preferred solution,
thereby ensuring an optimal sustainable solution across generations. Perhaps the greatest limitation to the
model developed in equation (1) is that uncertainty has been omitted. Figure 4 repeats the second panel in
figures 2 and 3, but includes random draws from the distribution of the conditional residuals associated
with the estimated price, cost, and fish population dynamic relationships.
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Figure 4.- Variablility in total revenues, total costs, and net revenues when prices, costs, and fish population
dynamics are stochastic. In the first panel, total revenues are represented by diamonds and total costs are represented
by circles.

Neglect of uncertainty may lead to undue confidence in the choice of optimal sustainable harvest levels
and allocations. Moreover, because society is unlikely to be neutral to the risks associated with
uncertainty, the optimal sustainable solution when stock dynamics and economics benefits are stochastic
fishery is likely to differ from the optimal solution when there is no uncertainty. There are three principle
sources of uncertainty. First, the form of structural relationships governing the creation of net benefits and
stock dynamics are unknown and may depend on unobservable causal factors. Second, structural
relationships may change over time. Third, even when the structures of functional relationships are known
stationary processes, there is error in the observation of outcomes. Standard stochastic simulationoptimization techniques can be used to address uncertainty associated with the estimation of structural
relationships. Criddle and Havenner (1991) develop an approximation approach that addresses the
problem of model specification. The solution of an optimal control problem similar to equation (1), but
with approximate structural relationships, is presented in Criddle (1993). Addressing the uncertainty
associated with nonstationarities in the structural relationships is particularly challenging. If the nature of
possible changes is predictable, conditional stochastic simulations (see e.g. , Criddle et al. 1998) can be
used to address the problem of nonstationary structural relationships. Uncertainty associated with changes
in the behavior of structural relationships cannot be modeled if the character of such changes cannot be
anticipated. Management strategies developed without consideration of uncertainty are unlikely to be
optimal and are likely to be infeasible (see e.g., Criddle 1996; Criddle and Streletski 2000) when model
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structure is unknown or when observation of the structural relationships is subject to error. Nevertheless,
for didactic simplicity, the model developed below will assume that structural relationships are known,
time-invariant, and observed with certainty.

A Simulation-Optimization Model o/the Commercial and Sport Fisheries/or Pacific Halibut in the

North Pacific.
The general results derived above can be demonstrated in an empirically based model of the commercial
and sport fisheries for Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) in the North Pacific. For simplicity, the
model will ignore age-class structure and interactions among species. In addition, the model only
considers net use benefits associated with commercial and recreational fishing. The representations of
commercial and sport fishery bioeconomics are based on Criddle (1994) and Herrmann et al. (2001),
respecti vely.
The net benefits of commercial and sportfishing can be defined as the sum of net revenues and postharvest surplus in the commercial fishery, and the net benefits of sportfishing:
NBuse

=

NBc

+ NBs = TRe -

Tee

+ esc + NBs·

(1 ')

where NBs is the net benefit of sportfishing and NBc the net benefit of commercial fishing. The net
benefit of commercial fishing is equal to the sum of commercial consumer's surplus (eSc) and the
difference between total commercial revenues (TRe) and total commercial costs (Tee). Total commercial
revenues are the product of exvessel price (Pt) and the commercial harvest (he,! ). If exvessel demand is
represented by a simple linear price dependent relationship4 and average costs are modeled as a function
of fishing effortS, the exvessel market for halibut can be represented by
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Figure 5.-Exvessel demand and supply of halibut.

where commercial consumer's surplus (eSc) is represented by the integral between the exvessel demand
curve and the market clearing price and commercial net revenues (TRe - Tee) are represented by the
integral between the market clearing price and average cost.
The magnitude commercial net revenues can also be represented as the difference between total
commercial revenues and costs:

4

PI =a+h( he ,I )= $3.301-$O.026( he,1 )
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NRc

= TRe - Tee = ahe + bhe2 - cahef31 Xf31

(2)

This relationship id depicted in Figure (6).
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Figure 6.-Comrnercial net revenues.

The sustainable yield (hSY ,t ) is represented as a simple polynomial of biomass 6 :
(3)
Consequently, the magnitude of the sustainable yield varies in relation to biomass.
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Figure 7.-Sustainable yields.

Equations (2) and (3) can be combined to identify total and net sustainable commercial revenues.

6 Criddle and Havenner (1991) motivate this simple representation as a formal approximation of latent dynamic
processes.
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Figure 8.-Commercial net revenues.

Because exvessel price is inversely related to the magnitude of commercial harvests, commercial total
revenues are maximized at harvest levels below hMSY . In addition, because search costs are inversely
related to biomass, commercial net revenues are maximized when biomass is above the biomass that
maximizes sustainable yields (XMSY ).
Because exvessel demand was modeled as a simple linear price dependent function of commercial
catches, the corresponding consumer's surplus can be represented as:

esC,!

=

I(

f( hc,t ) - p; )dhc,t =

}0( a -

(a

+ bhc,t ) )hc,t

(4)

O.013( ht,t )

=

That is, commercial consumer's surplus is a strictly increasing function of the level of commercial
harvests. Because the sustainable yield is maximized at intermediate levels of biomass, commercial
consumer's surplus is largest at XMSY
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Figure 9.-Commercial consumer's surplus.

Commercial net revenues (equation 2) and commercial consumer's surplus (equation 4) combine to form
total commercial net benefits
(5)
Figure (10) depicts the relationship between total costs, total revenues, and net revenues as a function of
the magnitude of sustainable yields and the status halibut stocks.
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Figure lO.-Consumer's surplus, harvester net revenues, and total net benefits of commercial fishing.

The association between commercial net benefits and biomass indicates that combined net revenues and
consumer's surplus is maximized at a lower level of biomass and correspondingly higher sustainable yield
that the maximization of commercial net revenues alone. That is, when benefits to consumers are treated
on an equal footing with benefits to harvesters, the optimal harvest level differs from the level that would
be optimal from the perspective of a sole-owner or a group of quota shareholders who behave
analogously.

The net benefits of sportfishing are defined as the sum across individuals of the net benefits received
conditional to the decision to participate in the sportfishing activity. Herrmann et al. (2001) use a random
effects probit model to estimate the probability of taking a halibut sportfishing trip based on trip attributes
and demographic characteristics:
P(participationi) = 'flo

+ 'fllPt + Wt T BWt + nt T Ant + Zt Tv,

(6)

where Pt is the price of taking a halibut sportfishing trip, nt and Wt are vectors catch by species,
number, and weight, and Zt are demographic characteristics used as proxies for unobservable tastes and
preferences that influence the probability of participation. Conditional individual participation
probabilities are aggregated into estimates of total demand using a simulation-based sample enumeration
method (BenAkiva and Lerman 1985) that takes into account differences in demographic characteristics
and variability in the number of days fished per year by developing forecasts for each individual in the
sample. Changes in the probability of individual participation lead to shifts in the total demand for
sportfishing trips and to changes in angler welfare.
If all factors except expected catch per trip are held constant, the relationship between changes in
expected catch and changes in participation is represented by:
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Figure 11. Percentage change in the probability that the average sport fisher will participate as a function of changes
in expected halibut catch..

Following Hanemann (1999), conditional estimates of angler welfare ( NBs ) are calculated from the
estimated participation rate model as the product of the weighted average compensating variation per trip
taken and the total number of angler-days spent fishing. The relationship between sportfishing net
benefits and percentage changes in expected angler success is represented in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. The effect of changes in expected halibut catch on the magnitude of total compensating variation.

These percentage changes can be rescaled as changes in the expected number of trips taken as a function
of changes in the average catch per trip.
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Figure 13 .-Changes in the number of sportfishing trips taken as a function of average catch per trip.
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The demand for sportfishing trips can also be mapped as a function of the number of trips taken:
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Figure I4.-Angler demand and average cost per trip.In this projection, sportfishing net benefits are the integral
between angler demand and the average cost function. This relationship can be projected into a space
representing sportfishing net benefits as a function of total sportfishing catches.
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Figure I5.-Marginal sportfishing net benefits.The associated total level of sportfishing net benefits is the
integral of the marginal net benefits
NBs

= ¢In( hs + 1) = 17.6341n( hs + 1)

(8)

This relation ship can be represented graphically as:
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Figure I6.-Total angler surplus as a function of the sustainable yield.Taken alone, the sportfishing model
suggests that angler net benefits (NBs) will be maximized under a maximum sustainable yield
management strategy, but that the incremental net benefits are very low for allocations greater than 20-30
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million lbs.

The commercial and sport fishing models represented in equations (5) and (8) and Figures (10) and (16)
represent exclusive allocations to either sport or commercial fishing. The problem posed in equation (1 ')
involves equating marginal net benefits across sport and commercial fishing. That is, the problem requires
a simultaneous selection of a level of sustainable yield and an allocation of that sustainable yield between
sport and commercial fishers. The commercial and sport fishing models developed in equations (5) and
(8) can be combined to restate the optimization model in equation (1):

+ NBs) = TRe - TCe + CSe + NBs = ahe + Y;bhe2 s.t. ht = he,t + hs,t = ('Y1 -l)xt + 'Y2xt

Max( NBc

cOLhef3] Xf32

+ ¢ In( hs + 1)

(1 ")

The solution to this constrained optimization can be found by solving a related unconstrained
(Lagrangian) function formed by augmenting the objective with the constraine:

Max(L) = ahe,t

+ Y;bhl,t

- cOLhtjx fJ2

+ ¢In( hs,t + 1) + At (he,t + hs,t -

('Y1 -l)xt

+ 'Y2xt)

(1 "')

Setting the derivatives of this Lagrangian functions with respect to the control variables (he,t, hs,t) and
Lagrange multipliers (At) equal to zero, yields a set of necessary conditions for an optimum.
If w == Xf2 and z

== ( 'Y1 _1)2 + 4'Y2ht, then

Xt = [ __1_)( 'Y1 -1) ± (_l_)zYz, and the marginal net
2'Y2
2'Y2

benefits of commercial fishing are:

dL _
( ( fJ]-i)
fJ] dW)_
( ( f3] -i)
fJ] dwdx dz )
dh -a+bhe- COL f31he
w+he dh -a+bhe-COL f31he
w+he dxdzdh +A.
e
e
e

(7)

Where

dx
dz

So,

Thus the marginal net benefits of commercial fishing can be represented by:

7

See e.g. , Clark (1976, 1985); Bj0mdal (1988); Hannesson (1993).
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dL=a+bh -ca ( (3/h ({3,-1)W +h{3, dW]+A
dhe
e
e
e dh
e

= a + bhe = a

+ bhe -

cal ,6lhi ,s, -I)x,s, ± hf ' ,62X(,s,-

I) (

hI _1)2 + 4"12 (he + hs )

ca(3/hi {3,-1) x{3] ± cahf' (32X({3]-1) (( ~/ -1/

= a + bhe - ca(3/he({3,-/ )x{3] ±

2

(7')

+ 4'"'(2 (he + hs ) )-~ + A .

cah{3] (3 x( (3] - 1)
e

r,v, )+ A

~(~/ _1)2 +4~2(he +hs)

+A

The marginal net benefits of sport fishing are:

= d¢ln(hs +1) + A = e(_1_]+A.

dL
dhs

dhs

hs

(8)

+1

The total net benefits of commercial and sport fishing are maximized when the marginal net benefits of
commercial fishing are equated with the marginal net benefits of sportfishing:
(9)
The Lagrange multiplier A represents the marginal net benefit of an increase in the sustainable yield
associated
(10)
Using equations (7) and (8) to allocate the sustainable yield between commercial and sport fishers results
in the sport and commercial catch levels depicted in Figure (17):
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Figure 17.-0ptimal allocation of sustainable yield.

The optimal allocation of the sustainable yield to commercial and sport fisheries depends on the level of
stock biomass. Because the marginal net benefits of sport fishing exceed the marginal net benefits of
commercial fishing at low sustainable yields, catch is first allocated to the sport fishery. 8 As the quantity

It is important to acknowledge that this result is probably an artifact of the model specification. The data available
for estimating a sportfishing net benefits function did not allow for estimation of the relationship between average
trip costs and halibut population size. It is likely that the cost of catching a halibut increase as popUlation size
declines. Consequently, the net benefits of sport fishing are probably overstated at low levels of biomass.
8
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of fish allocated to the sort fishery increases, the marginal net benefit of additional sport fish catches
declines. When the marginal net benefit of sportfishing drops below the marginal net benefit of
commercial fishing, subsequent harvest shares are allocated to the commercial fishery. The optimal total
net benefits of commercial and sportfishing are represented in Figure 18.
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Figure 18.-Net benefits of optimal allocations of sustainable yield. Thin lines in the second panel represent
sustainable yields at biomasses below xMSY. Thick lines in the second panel represent sustainable yields at
biomasses above x MSY .

At low biomass levels, the marginal net benefits of commercial fishing are so small that most of the
sustainable yield is allocated to the sport fishery. At intermediate levels of biomass, the marginal net
benefits of commercial fishing increase and an increasing large share of the sustainable yield is allocated
to the commercial fishery. At very high biomass levels, the sustainable yield is small and it is optimal to
allocate most of the sustainable yield to the sport fishery. The sum of sport and commercial net benefits is
maximized at a biomass of 443.5 million lbs. with catches of 44.9 million lbs allocated to the commercial
fishery and 18.0 million lbs allocated to the sport fishery (Tables 1 and 2). The relationship between the
sustainable yield and sport, commercial, and total net benefits is reflected in the second panel in Figure
18. The upper arms of the total and commercial net benefit curves correspond to biomasses above XMSY.
The upper arm of the sportfishing net benefits curve corresponds to biomasses below XMSY.
The optimal allocation rule is perhaps easiest to recognize when the shares to sport and commercial
fishers are represented as percentages of the sustainable yield (Figure 19):
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Figure 19.-0ptimal allocations of sustainable yield. Thin lines in the second panel represent sustainable yields at
biomasses below xMSY. Thick lines in the second panel represent sustainable yields at biomasses above xMSY.

Figures 17 and 18 depict the optimal allocation of sustainable yields and the net benefits associated with
those yields. The overall optimal solution to equation (1 ''') is to manage for a biomass of 443.5 million
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lbs and to allocate 71 % the 62.9 million lbs sustainable yield to the commercial fishery, with the balance
allocated to sportfishing. The overall optimal is solution is estimated to provide US$55.2 million in net
revenue to commercial harvesters, US$26.2 million in consumer surplus to the purchasers of commercial
catches, and US$5I.9 million in net sportfishing benefits (Table 2). There are several reasons why the
fishery might not be managed for the overall optimal solution. In addition to the problems of model
misspecification and uncertainty described above, the presence (absence) and characteristics of rightsbased management programs will influence the likelihood that the overall optimal solution will emerge.
In addition, because the overall optimal solution is suboptimal with respect to the provision of net benefits
to different stakeholders. Consequently, the actual solution may closely reflect the preferences of
politically empowered stakeholders. Tables 1 and 2 characterize the distribution of catch and benefits
under a variety of management regimes. Value to the sport and commercial fisheries is independently
optimized in the solutions reported in Table 1 and jointly optimized in the solutions reported in Table 2.
Table I.-Characteristics of alternative management regimes independently optimized for commercial or
sport fishing.

Biomass (million lbs.)
Commercial catch (million lbs.)
Sport catch (million lbs.)
Price (US$)
Effort (million skates)
Commercial net revenue (US$ million)
Consumer's surplus (US$ million)
Commercial net benefits (US$ million)
Sport net benefits (US$ million)
Total net benefits (US$ million)

Open
Access
444.5
62.7
0
$1.12
0.167
0
$51.1
$51.1
0
$51.1

Max(SY)

Max(NRc)

Max(CSc)

Max(NBc)

Max(NBs)

326.1
72.3
0
$1.42
0.381
-$41.9
$67.8
$25.9
0
$25.9

536.5
42.2
0
$2.21
0.055
$72.0
$23.1
$95.1
0
$95.1

326.1
72.3
0
$1.42
0.381
-$41.9
$67.8
$25.9
0
$25.9

490
54.0
0
$1.90
0.100
$64.4
$37.9
$102.2
0
$102.2

326.1
0
72.3
0
0
0
0
$75.7
$75.7

The open access solution (Table 1) represents a fishery managed without consideration of benefits to
commercial consumers or sport fishers and where the commercial fishers are unable to agree to behave
like a sole owner. While the open access solution does not provide positive net benefits to sport or
commercial fishers, it provides substantial (US$5I.I million) net benefits to the purchasers of
commercially harvested fish. This result provides an explanation for why processors often oppose the
implementation of rights-based fishery management programs. In a purely commercial fishery,
maximization of sustainable yields generates US$67.8 million in net benefits to fish purchasers and net
operating losses ofUS$41.9 million for commercial fishers. Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that
commercial fishers would harvest the MSY. Net sportfishing benefits are maximized when commercial
fishing is disallowed and catches approximate MSY. A sole owner of an exclusively commercial fishery
would choose to harvest a sustainable yield of 42.2 million lbs, earning US$72 million in net revenues
and coincidentally providing US$23.I million in net benefits to fish purchasers. If fishery managers were
interested in maximizing the total net benefits of commercial fishing, they would set the TAC equal to 54
million lbs and implement regulations to induce commercial harvesters to behave like a sole owner. In so
doing, the commercial fishery would generate total net benefits ofUS$I02.2 million; US$64.4 million in
net revenue for harvesters and US$3 7.9 million in net benefits for fish consumers.
The solutions represented in Table 2 maximize net benefits to various stakeholders conditional on the
optimal allocation of sustainable yields between the commercial and sport fisheries.
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Table 2.-Characteristics of alternative management regimes jointly optimized for commercial and sport
fishing.
Biomass (million lbs.)
Commercial catch (million lbs.)
Sport catch (million lbs.)
Price (US$)
Effort (million skates)
Commercial net revenue (US$ million)
Consumer's surplus (US$ million)
Commercial net benefits (US$ million)
Sport net benefits (US$ million)
Total net benefits (US$ million)

Max(SY)

Max(NRc)

Max(CSc)

Max(NBc)

Max(NBs)

Max(NB)

326.1
37.1
35.2
$2.34
0.136
$34.9
$17.8
$52.8
$63.3
$116.1

512.1
37.4
11.4
$2.33
0.066
$61.9
$18.1
$80.0
$44.3
$124.3

422.5
45.3
20.6
$2.12
0.117
$51.7
$26.7
$78.4
$54.2
$132.6

474.5
42.7
14.6
$2.19
0.089
$59.5
$23.6
$83 .1
$48 .5
$131.6

192.3
8.9
51.2
$3.07
0.048
$9.2
$1.0
$10.2
$69.7
$80.0

443.5
44.9
18.0
$2.13
0.107
$55.2
$26.2
$81.4
$51.9
$133.3

The first thing to notice in Table 2 is that the overall optimal solution is inferior to all other solutions from
the perspective of at least one of the three stakeholders represented in the optimization model. From the
perspective of commercial fishers, the solutions that maximize commercial net revenues, commercial net
benefits, and even net benefits to fish consumers are all preferred to the solution that maximizes overall
net benefits. Similarly, sport fishers prefer solutions that maximize net angler benefits, maximize
sustainable yields, or maximize net benefits for commercial consumers. Another important result
presented in Table 2 is that consideration of the joint benefits of commercial and sport fishing provides
larger overall net benefits than are generated when the goal of fishery management is solely motivated by
an interest in maximizing net benefits to commercial or sport fishers (Table 1). The results also emphasize
the importance of considering the benefits that accrue to those who purchase commercial catches.
Although the solutions that maximize overall net benefits, maximize the net benefits for purchasers of
commercial catches, or maximize the net benefits of commercial fishing produce similar levels of overall
benefits, they involve quite different allocations between sport and commercial fisheries. This suggests
that even when the fishery is managed to maximize net benefits across multiple stakeholders, there may
be considerable flexibility in the choice of who to favor in the allocation. That is, there are multiple nearly
equally efficient solutions with differing distributional consequences. Consequently, even if all of the
stakeholders agree to abide by a solution that maximized net benefits across uses, they will probably
contest the allocation decision.

If the demand for commercially harvested fish increases (decreases), the optimal solution can be expected
to allocate a larger (smaller) catch to the commercial fishery. Decreases (increases) in the cost of
commercial harvests can be expected to have similar effects. Increases in the cost of travel to Alaska can
be expected to reduce the net benefits of sportfishing, implying that reallocating the sustainable yield in
favor of the commercial fishery would maximize the overall net benefits. Changes in population (of
people) or average income influence the demand for commercial catches and the demand for sportfishing
opportunities and will have an indeterminate effect on the magnitude of the optimal sustainable yield and
the optimal allocation of between sport and commercial fisheries. If sportfishing demand changes to favor
an increased level of catch-and-release fishing, the overall optimal solution can be expected to include
increased commercial catches. Changes in ocean productivity that affect the carrying capacity or the
intrinsic population growth rate of halibut will also affect the optimal sustainable yield and the optimal
allocation of that sustainable yield.
Because changes in ocean productivity, changes in the demand or supply functions in the commercial
fishery, and changes in the willingness to pay and participation cost function in the sport fishery affect the
optimal sustainable yield and the optimal allocation of the optimal sustainable yield, any initially optimal
allocation will be suboptimal in subsequent periods. Consequently, allocations would need to be revisited
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whenever the economic or biological conditions change. Rather that address the between user-group
allocation decision through political processes, it might be possible to design a system of transferable
harvest privileges or territorial use rights that could shift the burdensome allocation battles from the
management arena into the market place.

Although the model developed in this section did not represent nonuse benefits or use benefits such as
subsistence harvests, it is possible to anticipate how the optimal solution would change if such values had
been modeled. Mathematically, the economics of subsistence fisheries resemble sport fishery economics.
The net benefits of subsistence fishing could be estimated using contingent valuation techniques, perhaps
developed in a willingness to be compensated framework rather than a willingness to pay framework. The
net benefits of subsistence fishing are likely to be an increasing (at a decreasing rate) function of catch.
Including a subsistence fishery would involve a three-way allocation of the sustainable yields and
probably suggest an optimal solution closer to the maximum sustainable yield solution. If nonuse benefits
were assumed to be an increasing function of biomass, including nonuse benefits in the model would shift
the optimal solution towards higher levels of biomass with correspondingly lower sustainable yields
partitioned among the users.

Practical Opportunities and Limitations for Maximizing Sustainable Net Benefits
Theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest that when compared to regulated open access, rightsbased management systems increase harvester net revenues, increase overall net economic benefits,
improve safety, and increase conservation and stewardship incentives. The opportunity for increased
harvester net revenues is greatest when the rights are transferable, that less economically efficient fishers
will find it advantageous to sell their quota shares or spatial use rights to more efficient fishers. To the
extent that stock conservation and stewardship increase the capitalized value of quota shares,
transferability encourages the most responsible fishers to acquire additional spatial use rights or quota
shares. If rights can be defined in a way that is meaningful across use and nonuse values and to the extent
that all use and nonuse values can be fully captured, self-interest and transferability will encourage the
movement of the quota shares/spatial use rights to the use/nonuse that generates the greatest marginal net
benefit, ensuring the maximization of overall net benefits. The appeal of rights-based management
systems lies in their potential to channel rational self-interest in a way that coincidentally maximizes
overall net benefit. Because they exploit an alignment of individually rational actions and socially optimal
outcomes, rights-based management are potentially self-regulating. Although theoretically possible, the
knowledge and control needed to maximize overall net benefit through command and control systems is
overwhelming and such systems have failed to yield sustain overall net economic benefits or the resource
base on which they depend.
With the apparent advantages of rights-based management systems, it seems reasonable to wonder why
IFQs, Co-Ops, and TURFs have not been warmly embraced and uniformly adopted. The answer is that
the creation and enforcement of rights is not costless (Anderson and Hill 1975; Dennen 1976). Because it
can be costly to change the legal and social institutions that have been developed to support current
fishery management systems and because it can be costly to monitor and enforce quota shares or spatial
use rights, especially when there are numerous rights-holders, rights-based management systems will be
less prevalent than might otherwise be anticipated. Moreover, the advantages of rights-based systems are
reduced when the rights cannot be defined in a way that allows meaningful transfer across categories of
use and nonuse stakeholders, when the opportunity to freeride on nonuse benefits cannot be eliminated, or
when the benefits (costs) of individual stewardship are not fully captured by the self-same individuals.
With the foregoing caveats in mind, the follow section will speculate on the practical opportunities for
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using economic incentives to ensure that the flow of use, option, and nonuse benefits is not degraded
through time.

Commercial Fisheries-Economic incentives can be designed to increase the internalization of stock
externalities in rights-based commercial fisheries. This could be accomplished by coupling the rightsbased approach with performance standard or through unbundling the set of rights embodied in the quota
share or spatial use right. Examples of the former include overlapping fixed period leases with renewal
based on performance, zero-revenue auctions with performance standards reflected in the resale
provisions, and combinations of fees, taxes, and subsidies based on performance standards.
The design and performance of an overlapping lease system are described in Young and McCay (1995).
In brief, fixed period multi-year leases are granted to current fishers. Before the lease period expires,
fishers are offered an opportunity to switch to new fixed period leases that would commence in the next
time period and be operative for some time beyond the terminal year for the current lease. The new lease
could include stewardship requirements that are more stringent that those required under the current lease.
For example, the new lease might require reduced bycatches of non-target species or the adoption of gear
designed to have fewer undesirable effects on benthic communities. Fishers who willingly shift to the new
leases gain the advantage of longer economic planning horizons.
Zero-revenue auctions (Hausaker 1992) are used to encourage the adoption of sulfur dioxide emissions
reducing technology in mid-west US power plants. Under the Clean Air Act Acid Rain Program,
approximately 3% of all emission rights sunset annually. Government auctions the released rights, with
all sales proceeds going to the individuals whose rights were attenuated. NRC 1999b suggests that
inclusion of similar provisions in a rights-based fishery could be used ensure that at least a minimum
volume of rights would be released to the market at regular intervals and that the transactions would
reveal information about the value of the rights. The zero-revenue auction structure lends itself to
modifications that could improve resource stewardship. For example, organizations representing nonuse
beneficiaries could acquire quota shares or spatial use rights through competing in the auction. In a
similar manner, the management agency could retire a portion of the attenuated rights, thereby reducing
total catch, and in the case of TURFs, creating Marine Protected Areas. This type of fractional reduction
of rights has been used in the Florida spiny lobster fishery to reduce fishing capacity (SAFMC 1992). It
would also be possible for fishery managers to attach performance criteria to the rights released through
the zero-revenue auction. For example, exercise of the auctioned rights might be subject to more stringent
bycatch standards or gear restrictions. While differing from zero-revenue auctions in many respects, the
annual contract negotiations related to community development quotas (CDQs) in Alaska's groundfish
fisheries suggest that a variety of social objectives (e.g. employment and training opportunities) can be
built into the auction fishing rights (NRC 1998).
Overlapping leases and zero-revenue auctions use voluntary market transactions to influence resource
stewardship. It is also possible to use regulations, taxes, fees, and subsidies in combination with rightsbased management systems to encourage additional conservation and stewardship. For example, the CDQ
and Co-Op fisheries for walleye pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) in the Bering Sea are subject to
bycatch caps intended to minimize adverse impacts on other directed fisheries. The CDQs and Co-Ops are
also subject to time and area closures intended to reduce the possibility that those fisheries could
jeopardize recovery of Steller sea lion (Eumetopias jubatus) populations. Taxes, fines, fees, and subsidies
affect harvester net revenues and consequently influence fishing activities. For example, the adoption of
measure to reduce seabird bycatch has been accelerated by the US Fish and Wildlife Service's decision to
subsidize the purchase of paired streamer lines. Fines for individuals who exceed their quotashare or catch
non-target species encourage fishers to avoid bycatch and overages. Differential taxes or fees can be
designed to affect the amount of bycatch taken and the types of gear employed in the fishery.
Property rights represent a bundle of entitlements and obligations. It may be possible to encourage
conservation and stewardship by refining the scope and scale at which the rights are defined and allowing
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transfer of fractional rights. For example, there is probably some price at which halibut IFQ holders
would agree to forgo the right to fish in a region of particular interest to sport fishers. Because halibut
quota shares are currently defined on a gross geographic scale, it would be difficult to engineer such an
agreement. However, if managers agreed to help monitor and enforce voluntary small-scale spatial
partitioning, for example by requiring vessel transponders and releasing data on locations fished, it is
possible that commercial fishers could be induced to fish outside areas of interest to sport fishers. Note
that in this example, the commercial fishers did not transfer their quotashare, they transferred their right to
fish their quota share in a section of the management area. The Nature Conservancy and Ducks Unlimited
have actively employed similar fractional rights transfers to obtain conservation easements from
landholders. Similarly, if the bundled target-bycatch quotashares in the Bering Sea CDQ and Co-Op
fisheries were unbundled, halibut or crab fishers could encourage bycatch reductions in the by purchasing
the bycatch rights.
If rights can be defined on a natural spatial/temporal scale, a scale at which there is little overlap (through
migration etc.) with the rights of other holders, stock externalities will be minimized and the value of
good stewardship will be capitalized in the value of the quotashare or spatial use right. Stock externalities
can also be minimized if the number of shareholders fishing a given stock is small enough for the benefits
of collective action to offset the private benefits of reneging on the collective agreement.

Sport Fisheries-The large number and complex motivations of actual and potential participants
complicate the design of economic incentives to reduce stock and congestion externalities in sport
fisheries. Command-control systems including site-specific user fees, gear restrictions, catch, and
retention have the potential for constraining total removals and congestion, but they do not ensure that net
sport fishing benefits will be maximized or that there is an optimal allocation among use categories or
between use and nonuse of fishery resources. An option that could be useful in some sport fisheries would
be to adopt an annual lottery based allocation such as that used for many big-game hunting opportunities.
Because every applicant has an equal probability of receiving a permit and because the number of permits
is set to avoid overexploitation of the stock, a lottery would be unlikely to conflict with interpretations of
the Public Trust doctrine. If lottery winners are permitted to auction their permits, individuals who place
the greatest value in sportfishing for a particular species at a specific location will be able to obtain
permits. Equity concerns are at least partially satisfied by the fact that every applicant has an equal
opportunity of being drawn and that permit sales are voluntary. By itself, a lottery-auction allocation does
not address stock externalities as well as they might be addressed under longer-term rights. However, it is
difficult to imagine how long-term rights could be designed to be consistent with current interpretation of
the Public Trust doctrine.
The potential utility of economic incentives for encouraging sustainable sport fisheries is perhaps greatest
in the interface between sport fisheries and rights-based commercial fisheries. While there are few such
interfaces at this time, there are several fisheries where sport fishing is a substantial component of fishing
mortality and where the commercial sector could be organized under a rights-based system. The proposed
introduction of IFQs for halibut charter vessels in Alaska and the possibility that quota shares may be
transferable between the sport and commercial fisheries has the potential to reduce allocation battles
between commercial and a large share of the sport fishery. Although it is difficult to imagine individual
sport fishers or charter operators acquiring enough quota shares to internalize the stock externality, it is
not inconceivable that groups of operators could collectively manage their quota shares to avoid localized
depletion problems.

Nonuse Benejiciaries-The challenge of eliminating the freerider problem is central to any attempt to
reflect nonuse values in the design of sustainable fisheries. While freeriders are an important problem in
the sport fishery, the set of participants provides a good indication of who benefits from sportfishing. In
the case of nonuse benefits, it may be impossible to identify the set of beneficiaries let alone estimate the
magnitude of net benefits that they would derive under alternative fishery management strategies.
Nevertheless, the freerider problem has not prevented the Nature Conservancy or Ducks Unlimited from
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obtaining conservation easements or outright ownership of lands that provide nonuse benefits to their
memberships. Consequently, the existence offreeriders may pose a lesser impediment to the expression
of nonuse benefits than is posed by the lack of property rights. Suppose for a moment that all nonuse
beneficiaries could be convinced to contribute their full willingness to pay into a fund dedicated to
sustainable fisheries. If the fishery is managed under regulated open access rules, the way to express the
nonuse value would be to engage in lobbying the management agency and any gains in nonuse benefits
would be obtained as uncompensated losses to fishers. It would be as though Ducks Unlimited were
precluded from purchasing lands and conservation easements and reduced to buying advertisements that
encourage landowners to voluntarily adopt duck friendly farming practices. While the advertisements
might influence some landowners, it is likely that more could be influenced if they were offered cash
compensation. In a rights-based fishery it could be possible for nonuse values to be reflected in the
acquisition of spatial use rights or quotashares. As an added consequence of owning fishing rights, the
nonuse beneficiaries would face the opportunity cost of leaving their rights unfished. When faced with
those opportunity costs, it is not unlikely that they would choose to exercise a portion of the fishing right.
(See e.g. Baden and Stroup 1981)

Conclusion
The NRC review of sustainability in marine fisheries (NRC 1999a) concludes: "universal application of
conservative management on a single-species basis would go a long way toward reducing
overexploitation of the world's marine fisheries." Similarly, good management of fisheries for use
benefits would go a long way towards preserving the time stream of use, option, and nonuse benefits. The
OECD Committee for Fisheries (OECD 1997) concludes that: "Experience has shown that a regime
which does not adequately limit fishing capacity may lead to overexploitation and poor economic
performance. In addition, management regimes which limit the total catch, or the number of fishing
vessels, or which restrict the efficiency of the harvesting sector, including technical measures and TACs,
have generally yielded poor results when used in isolation i.e. without complementary measures." The
suggested complementary measures include limited entry permits, IFQs, TURFs, and community based
management systems. Hanna and Munasinghe (1995a, 1995b) conclude that property rights regimes can
playa crucial role in harnessing market forces to support sustainable resource use. In the conclusion to his
examination of sustainable fishery systems, Charles (2001) emphasizes the advantage of rights-based selfregulatory institutions. He notes that rights-based management systems "help to clarify the roles and
responsibilities of the various players in the fishery, and thereby steer incentives in the desired direction."
However, he cautions that "an inappropriate rights system can lead to undesired consequences, such as a
loss of resilience in communities of institutions".
This chapter has little to add to the findings of previous studies; the key impediment to sustainable use
and option values is the lack of clearly articulated property rights. In commercial fisheries, the ownership
by capture rules lead harvesters to dissipate net revenues and encourages uneconomic and biologically
unsustainable harvest levels. In sport fisheries, the lack of effective limits on the number of sport fishers
and magnitude of sportfishing catches has led to substantial reductions in the commercial T ACs that may
have reduced overall net benefits to society. When political muscle is the basis for allocating TAC among
commercial, sport, and subsistence users, the resultant allocations cannot be expected to maximize overall
net economic benefits. The key impediments to the provision of nonuse benefits arise from their character
as public goods and the difficulty of eliminating opportunities for beneficiaries to freeride.
A necessary condition for fully harnessing the self-regulating power of markets to constrain harvests and
adjust the allocation fishery resources is the creation of meaningful and enforceable in situ rights. While it
may not be possible to create an ideal set of rights, it should be possible to improve on the status quo.
IFQs, Co-Ops, and TURFs have been found to address many of the economic inefficiencies that

1212012001

26

Economic Principles of Sustainable Fisheries Management

characterize traditional commercial fisheries. Broadening the ownership criteria to allow other
stakeholders the opportunity to acquire and own quota shares or spatial use rights may be possible. For
example, it is easy to imagine that a group of sport or subsistence fishers or nonuse beneficiaries could
ensure their interest in the fishery through acquisition of TURFs: TURFs have been used to allocate
harvest rights in some European sport fisheries; TURF-like rights have been recognized for Native
Americans in several US and Canadian fisheries; and, TURFs are analogous to the land holdings and
conservation easements that the Nature Conservancy, Ducks Unlimited, and similar organizations have
acquired to secure use and nonuse benefits for their membership. Annual individual harvest rights are
being considered as a mechanism for allocating sportfishing opportunities in big game fisheries.
Permanent IFQs are being examined as a mechanism for addressing the allocation of halibut T AC
between commercial fishers and charter operators in Alaska. Because IFQs and Co-Op shares are based
on a percentage of the annual T AC, the potential nonuse benefits of acquiring and holding quota shares
generate a stock externality in favor of commercial, sport, and subsistence fishers. Nevertheless, nonusers
could potentially acquire enough quota shares to influence overall stock levels for some species in some
regions. While these solutions will not eliminate all externalities or opportunities to freeride, they are
likely to promote sustainability to a greater degree than the status quo.
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Abstract
Economic prescriptions for the sustainable management of fisheries have typically been framed in the
context of commercial fisheries. Fishery management failures have been characterized as a consequence
of disjointedness between individually rational decisions and globally sensible outcomes-the "tragedy of
the commons". The solutions proposed by economists flow from the insight that rational self-interest can
lead to socially beneficial outcomes when ownership is secure and prices reflect the opportunity cost of
resource use. Theoretical and empirical analyses have demonstrated that sole ownership, individual
quotas, territorial use rights, fishing cooperatives, and common property management regimes can
promote biologically and economically sustainable fisheries. Nevertheless, implementation of these
"solutions" has met with resistance, due in part to the impossibility of uncoupling species within
ecological systems and conflict between the proposed solutions and broadly accepted concepts of social
justice. The problem of devising a sustainable management strategy is exacerbated in fisheries with
diverse consumptive and non-consumptive users. An empirically based simulation-optimization model is
used to characterize the biological and economic effects of alternative management regimes in a fishery
with commercial and sport fishers. The results are generalized to the case of additional use and nonuse
values.

Introduction
Sustainable fisheries management means different things to different people. From a narrowly singlespecies biological perspective, sustainable management of fisheries reduces to the adoption of regulatory
measures designed to ensure that the probability of stock or recruitment levels falling below specific
critical values does not exceed an acceptable risk level. Charles (2001) proposes comprehensive
perspective that incorporates ecological, socioeconomic, community, and institutional sustainability
concepts. In this chapter, sustainable fisheries management will be characterized as practices intended to
ensure that the expected flows of use, option, and nonuse benefits provided by the fishery are not
degraded through time.) Use benefits include the value of commercial, recreational, subsistence and other
cultural harvests, the value associated with observing fish in situ, the harvest value of trophic ally related
species, and the value of ecosystem services contributed by a sustainable fishery. Option value reflects the
value of preserving the opportunity to use a fishery resource at some future time as well as the value of
preserving the opportunity to use any other resource that is dependent on the sustainable fishery (Bishop
1982; Freeman 1984). Nonuse benefits are those obtained by vicarious consumers of the resource:

) This defInition is similar to that proposed in NRC (1999a), where sustainable fIshing is defIned as "fIshing
activities that do not cause or lead to undesirable changes in biological and economic productivity, biological
diversity, or ecosystem structure and functioning from one human generation to the next; sustainable fIshing does
not lead to ecological changes that foreclose options for future generations". The difference is that the defInition
adopted in this chapter characterizes the value of ecosystem services as nonuse economic benefIts and formally
recognizes the stochastic nature of the time stream of benefIts.
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